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  Leamer (1995), Rodrik (1997) and Wood (1995) have suggested, without qualification, that 
the demand-for-labor curve is more elastic when an economy is open than when it is closed.  I 
demonstrate that this proposition is not valid in general.  The proposition can be violated in both the 
2x2 and specific-factors models.  Furthermore, many of the results obtained by Rodrik (1997), 
assuming the proposition to be true, fail to hold in general when we spell out the full structure of the 
model. 
  Thus, within two most popular models of trade--the 2x2 and specific-factors models--, there 
is no guarantee that openness leads to a greater incidence of higher labor standards being borne by 
workers or to greater volatility in wage earnings as a consequence of shocks to the economy.  It is 
also not true in general that when openness lowers the bargaining power of workers, it contributes 
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Trade Openness:  Consequences for the Elasticity of  
Demand for Labor and Wage Outcomes 
1. Introduction 
  Recently, Leamer (1995), Wood (1995) and Rodrik (1997) have postulated, without 
qualification, that the demand-for-labor curve is more elastic when an economy is open than when it 
is closed.  Using the fixed-coefficients version of the 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model, Leamer (1995, 
Diagrams 1 and 2) shows that the demand for labor in a small, open economy is perfectly elastic 
over the intermediate range characterized by incomplete specialization in production.  Without 
proof, he then postulates that, if the economy is closed, the demand for labor is downward sloped 
over an intermediate range that overlap partially with the perfectly elastic range derived for the 
small, open economy case.  Based on this construction, Leamer shows that the real wage for a labor-
scarce economy must be higher in a closed than an open economy.  In a symposium on trade and 
wages in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Wood (1995) also adopts and reproduces this 
theoretical framework. 
  More importantly, in his provocatively titled book, Has Globalization Gone too Far?, taking 
the proposition that labor demand is more elastic in an open than closed economy, Rodrik offers 
three propositions, all implying that openness hurts the interests of unskilled workers.  Thus, without 
qualification, Rodrik offers the following conclusions: 
(i) The more open an economy, the greater the reduction in the wage received by workers as 
a result of the introduction of a higher labor standard. 
(ii) The more open an economy, the greater the volatility in both earnings and hours worked 
resulting from shocks to labor demand.  
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(iii) The greater the openness, the less the bargaining power of workers and, hence, the lower 
the wages of workers. 
  In this paper, I have two objectives.  First, I take issue with the basic Leamer-Rodrik-Wood 
proposition that the demand-for-labor curve is necessarily more elastic in an open than a closed 
economy.  I derive the demand for labor in both the open- and closed-economy settings and 
demonstrate that one cannot, in general, draw a direct relationship between the degree of openness 
and the elasticity of demand for labor.  While it is possible for an appropriately-defined labor-
demand curve to be more elastic in an open than a closed economy, under standard assumptions, it is 
equally possible for the opposite to be true.
1 
  Second, I argue that, at least on theoretical grounds, none of Rodrik's propositions is valid in 
general.  Drawing on the existing theoretical literature, based on standard assumptions, I offer 
examples under which the outcome is exactly opposite of what Rodrik (1997) predicts for each of 
his three assertions. 
  I am able to demonstrate the failure of Rodrik's propositions to hold in general in both the 
two-factor, two-sector model and the specific-factors model.  The 2x2 model on which the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory is based remains by far the most popular model among trade economists.  It 
is, nevertheless, criticized sometimes for exhibiting peculiar and extreme properties.  For instance, 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which says that a reduction in the price of the labor-intensive good 
leads to a proportionately larger reduction in the return to labor and a rise in the return to the other 
factor is thought to be a rather extreme result.  The specific-factors model, by contrast, is regarded as 
more plausible, yielding results that are generally consistent with our partial-equilibrium intuition 
 
     
1Moreover, the question of probability of outcomes cannot be determined outside of specific  
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[for example, see Neary (1978)].  A rise in the price of a good in this model leads to a 
proportionately smaller increase in the wage.  My demonstration that Rodrik's propositions can be 
invalidated in the 2x2 as well as the specific-factors model should lay to rest potential criticisms that 
the analysis merely exploits the extreme properties of the 2x2 model. 
  The broader concern that increased international mobility of one factor (for example, capital 
or skilled labor) may affect adversely the fortunes of another factor (for example, unskilled labor) 
which is immobile is not entirely new.  In the 1960s and 1970s, similar concerns had been expressed 
in the developing countries, which feared that the linking of the wage of their skilled workers to the 
corresponding wage in the global marketplace would adversely affect the unskilled.  Bhagwati and 
Hamada (1974) formally analyzed this phenomenon in the context of the literature that developed 
under the rubric of "brain drain".  Using the Harris-Todaro model, they studied the impact of skilled 
labor's integration into the global economy on the wages and unemployment of the unskilled.
2 
  The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, the shape of the labor-demand curve in open 
and closed economies is considered in the 2x2 and 3x2 models.  Though the main focus is on trade 
openness, the implications of capital mobility are also considered briefly.  In Section 3, a direct 
analysis of the implications of openness for wage outcomes is provided.  It is shown that the above-
mentioned propositions of Rodrik are not valid in general.  In Section 4, the paper is concluded. 
2.  Openness and the Demand-for-Labor Curve 
  Before I proceed to demonstrate that the demand-for-labor curve need not be more elastic in 
 
model structure and cannot therefore be answered at a general level. 
     
2Ironically, the policymakers and economists in developing countries have generally 
abandoned these pessimistic or "malign-impact" attitudes whereas Rodrik's (1997) contribution 
is representative of the recent embrace of such "anti-globalization" fears in the developed  
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an open economy than in a closed one, it is useful to summarize the precise approaches taken by the 
authors who have argued otherwise.  Leamer (1995) casts the problem within a two-good, two-
factor, general-equilibrium framework in which the factors are labeled skilled and unskilled labor.  
He derives formally the economy-wide demand curve for unskilled labor relative to that for skilled 
labor as a function of the real wage measured in terms of the labor-intensive good.  He assumes the 
country is open and small.  Leamer does not derive formally the demand for labor in a closed 
economy, however.  Instead, he relies on heuristic arguments to support the less elastic curve drawn 
under autarky.  Wood (1995) takes Leamer's construct as given and applies it to the analysis of the 
effect of trade on wages.  Both Leamer (1995) and Wood (1995) are explicit in defining openness in 
terms of goods trade rather than international capital mobility. 
  Rodrik (1997, chapter 2) begins the analysis with a partial-equilibrium diagram, focusing on 
the demand for and supply of labor in a specific sector.  Only heuristic arguments, rather than a 
formal derivation, are offered to rationalize the more elastic demand-for-labor curve in his analysis 
insofar as trade openness is concerned.  The only formal analysis is provided in Appendix A but that 
relates to openness to international capital flows, the comparison undertaken with trade openness 
with and without capital mobility.  Because the economy is assumed to be fully open to goods trade 
at all times, this analysis, which is strictly limited to studying the implications of capital mobility for 
the wage response in an open economy, says nothing about the impact of trade openness on the 
wage response. 
2.1  Trade Openness and the Elasticity of demand for Labor 
  The labor demand curve naturally depends on the underlying model.  Before I consider its 
 
countries.  See the Prebisch Lecture by Bhagwati (1996).  
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derivation in the 2x2 and specific-factors models, it may be noted that the partial-equilibrium 
approach to wage determination, employed by Rodrik in chapter 2 of his book, is a non-starter.  
Rodrik works with the demand for and supply of labor relating to a specific sector to determine the 
wage.  But this approach is valid only if the type of labor in question is specific to that sector, as may 
be the case with aeronautical engineers or nuclear physicists.  But Rodrik's concern is with unskilled 
labor about which there is consensus that it is a factor common to many sectors.  Empirical work on 
trade and wages identifies unskilled labor with either production workers or workers having 
education and experience below a certain threshold.  On either basis, unskilled workers are 
employed in a variety of sectors.  Once this is recognized, the case for studying wage determination 
in general rather than partial equilibrium is compelling.
3 
  The Two-Factor Model 
  Consider a two-sector, two-factor, small, open economy.  Let the two factors be labeled S 
and L where S stands for skilled labor and L for unskilled labor.  Denote the two goods by 1 and 2 
and let good 2 serve as the numeraire.   Assume further that good 1 uses skilled labor more 
intensively, i.e., for a given set of factor prices, S1/L1 > S2/L2 where Si and Li are the quantities of 
skilled and unskilled labor used in sector i.  Given the relative price from the world market, the unit-
cost pricing conditions allow us to determine the factor prices.  Thus, representing by s and w the 
skilled and unskilled wage, respectively, by p the relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2, and by 
ci(w, s) the unit-cost function for good i, we solve 
 
     
3One may argue that the partial-equilibrium approach can be justified by interpreting the labor 
supply curve relevant to the sector under consideration as the total labor endowment minus the 
demand for labor by all other sectors.  But under this interpretation, we will also have to take 
into account the impact of openness on the elasticity of labor supply.  Additional problems arise  
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(1a) c1(w, s) = p
0   and 
(1b) c2(w, s) = 1 
to obtain w
0 and s
0 as equilibrium unskilled and skilled wage in terms of good 2. 
  Next, letting Xi = Fi(Si, Li) ≡ Lifi(Si/Li) be the linear-homogeneous production function for 
good i, we can obtain the optimal Si/Li ratio by solving the following first-order condition of 
optimization by the firm. 
(2)  w = p
0[fi’(.) - (Si/Li)fi"(.)]. 
Substituting w = w
0, we can solve this equation for the optimal Si/Li ratio, which is represented by 
OAi in the upper panel of Figure 1.  Since sector 1 uses skilled labor more intensively, OA1 is 
steeper than OA2. 
  To derive the demand curve for unskilled labor, we ask the following question:  what is the 
wage rate consistent with a given quantity of L along the labor-demand curve?  We address this 
question by taking the goods price and the quantity of S fixed at p
0 and S
0, respectively.  Thus, in the 
upper panel of Figure 1, suppose we wish to know the wage rate at which the quantity of labor 
demanded is L
0.  This quantity of labor places the economy on point E
0 which lies in the 
diversification cone A1OA2.  It is then immediate that the wage rate, which allows the economy to 
absorb L
0, is w
0.  In the lower panel of Figure 1, measuring the quantity of labor on the horizontal 
axis and the wage in terms of the numeraire on the vertical axis, we obtain Q
0 as the point on the 
labor-demand curve.  By a similar argument, it is easy to see that, for quantities of labor lying on 
segment B1B2 in the upper panel, the wage rate along the demand curve remains w
0.  Therefore, we 
obtain segment Q1Q2 on the labor demand curve in the lower panel. 
 
which will become clear when I consider the specific-factors model.  
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  What happens to the wage rate when the quantity of labor is outside the diversification cone? 
 Thus, suppose the quantity demanded lies to the right of B2 as shown by L’ in the upper panel of 
Figure 1.  This places the economy on point E’, which lies outside the diversification cone A1OA2.  
At such a point, it becomes unprofitable to produce good 1 and all resources must be absorbed by 
sector 2.  The ratio of skilled-to-unskilled labor in sector 2 coincides with E’.  We can now obtain w
0 
by substituting S2/L2 = S
0/L’ in equation (2) for i = 2.  It can be verified that w’ < w
0.
4  Thus, the 
point on the labor-demand curve in the lower panel of Figure 1 can be represented by Q’.  In general, 
as the wage falls, the associated quantity of labor demanded moves further to the right of B1, while 
as the wage rises, the associated labor demanded moves further to the right of B1.  The labor-demand 
curve has the shape shown by DL
TDL
T in the lower panel of Figure 1.  This labor-demand curve is 
similar to that derived by Leamer (1995) for a small, open economy, the only difference being that 
he measures the ratio of labor to capital on the horizontal axis and assumes a constant coefficients 
technology. 
  The key question that confronts us is how this demand curve differs from the one that will 
obtain in the absence of trade.  At one level, it may be argued openness has little to do with the 
labor-demand curve.  Conventionally, the labor-demand curve is drawn for given vectors of goods 
prices and quantities of other factors used.  Recall, for example, that under perfect competition, 
microeconomics textbooks typically identify the labor-demand curve with the value of the marginal 
product, which is defined for given goods prices and quantities of other factors.  Under this 
interpretation, the labor demand curve depends on the chosen goods prices and quantities of other 
 
     
4From 2, we can verify that w declines as Si/Li declines.  For endowments inside the 
diversification cone (including its boundary), S2/L2 is given by OA2.  For endowments strictly 
below OA2, S2/L2 is flatter than OA2.  
 
 8 
                    
factors but not on whether the economy is open or closed. 
  Formally, suppose we write the revenue function in the standard form [Dixit and Norman 
(1980), chapter 2]: R(p1, p2, S, L), where R(.) is convex in prices and concave in factor endowments. 
 The inverse-demand function for unskilled labor is then given by w = RL(p1, p2, S, L) where RL(.) 
represents the first partial of R(.) with respect to the quantity of labor.  As long as we evaluate RL(.) 
at the same goods prices and S, the labor demand function is the same irrespective of whether the 
economy is open or closed.  Admittedly, the prices under autarky and free trade will differ.  But that 
merely requires us to evaluate RL(.) at different prices in the two cases.  There is no presumption that 
this fact gives rise to a higher elasticity of demand in one case than the other. 
  To relate the elasticity of demand for labor to the degree of openness, we must therefore 
define the labor-demand curve in a way that it takes into account the changes in the goods prices that 
accompany different levels of labor demand.
5  Such a definition leaves the labor-demand curve 
derived for a small open economy in Figure 1 unchanged but requires modification for a closed (or 
large, open) economy.
6  The key question is whether this modification necessarily results in a less 
elastic demand curve than the one obtained for a small, open economy. 
  To show that the answer to this question is in the negative, consider the upper panel of 
 
     
5While this definition allows us to relate the labor-demand curve to the degree of openness, it 
gives rise to a different problem.  The movements in the wage in terms of the numeraire good 
along the vertical axis are not matched identically by movements in the wage in terms of the 
other good.  In the present 2x2 model, a 10% rise in the wage in terms of the numeraire gives 
rise to a less than 10% rise in the wage in terms of the other good if the latter's price is rising.  
This problem becomes more serious in the specific-factors model since in that model a rise in the 
price of a good is accompanied by a rise in the wage in terms of the other (numeraire) good but a 
decline in it in terms of itself. 
     
6I limit the analysis in this paper to comparing the labor demand between two extremes: 
complete autarky and a small, open economy.  The intermediate case of a large, open economy 
can be easily accommodated into our analysis.  
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Figure 2 which shows the economy's production possibilities frontier for an initial endowment 
vector (S
0, L
0).  We denote the outputs of goods 1 and 2 by X1 and X2, respectively.  Suppose the 
autarky equilibrium is at A0, yielding p
0p
0 as the equilibrium autarky price.  For ease of comparison, 
assume further that the world price coincides with p
0p
0.  This means that the wage at which labor-
demand coincides with L
0 when the economy is open is the same as that under autarky, w
0. 
  Let us now ask how the wage rate changes along the demand curve at a larger quantity of 
labor, say, L’.  Assume that L’ is sufficiently close to L
0 that, holding the goods-price constant, the 
economy remains fully diversified.  We already know from Figure 1 that, in this case, if the 
economy is open and small, the wage compatible with L’ is unchanged; the demand is perfectly 
elastic over the range L
0L’. 
  But what if the economy is closed?  In view of the Rybczynski theorem, at the initial autarky 
price, the production point moves from A
0 to A
1.  If both goods exhibit positive income elasticities 
of demand, the consumption equilibrium lies to the southeast of A
0, say, A
2 along the production 
frontier E’F’ defined by endowment (S
0, L’).  This implies a higher relative price of good 1 and, via 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, a lower wage.  The labor-demand curve is downward sloped and, 
thus, less then perfectly elastic.  This gives us the case drawn by Leamer. 
  But, in general, there is no reason for preference to exhibit positive income elasticities of 
demand for all goods.  And, once we admit negative income elasticities, it is possible for the autarky 
equilibrium with endowments S
0 and L’ to be at A
1 or even to the northwest of that point, say, A
3.  If 
so, the relative price of good 1 under autarky is no higher than p
0 and the associated wage is no 
lower than w
0.  The labor demand is either horizontal (as in the small, open-economy case) or 
upward sloped between L









3 in the lower panel of Figure 2.  The higher elasticity under the 
assumption of a small, open economy is by no means guaranteed. 
  We may be inclined to drop the case of negative income elasticity as being special and 
unlikely and thus rescue the proposition that labor demand is more elastic in an open than closed 
economy.  It can be shown, however, that once we admit more than two goods, the possibility of a 
locally perfectly elastic or upward-sloped labor demand curve can arise even when preferences are 
homothetic.  With three or more goods and two factors, the output effects of an increase in the 
quantity of labor need not follow the Rybczynski pattern.  This property, in turn, opens the 
possibility of a locally horizontal labor demand in a closed economy despite all income elasticities 
being positive. 
  But this is not all.  Even confining ourselves to the two-good case and positive income 
elasticities for both products, the lower demand elasticity under autarky obtains only when the 
economy is assumed to be fully diversified.  If we admit the possibility of complete specialization, 
labor demand can be more elastic in a closed economy.  This is shown in Figure 3 where the labor-
demand curve under autarky is superimposed on the labor-demand curve under the assumption that 
the economy is open and small.  If the economy's endowment happens to coincide with L
0 or L’, the 
labor demand is unambiguously more elastic under autarky than under free trade.  The reason is that 
at endowment L
0 (or L’) and the given world price, the economy is completely specialized.  A given 
increase in the demand for labor must be accommodated entirely by the expansion of the industry in 
which the economy specializes.  When the economy is closed, however, both goods are produced, 




  Again, one may be inclined to dismiss this case as special.  But complete specialization by 
small, open economies is clearly a serious possibility.  Indeed, in his formal analysis in the 
Appendix, Rodrik (1997) himself assumes that his small economy is completely specialized in the 
production of the export good.  If he were to allow for diversification in production, as we will see 
later, the labor demand in his model will be perfectly elastic with as well as without capital mobility. 
  The Specific-Factors Model 
  In the specific-factors model, we can obtain a more elastic demand for labor under autarky 
than free trade even with two goods, full diversification and positive income elasticities of demand 
everywhere.  Before I demonstrate this, however, we must make explicit an index-number problem, 
which we were able to side step in the two-factor model. 
  Recall that, if we define the labor demand as the relationship between the wage and the 
quantity of labor demanded at constant goods prices, the labor demand does not depend on whether 
the economy is open or closed.  To make sense of the labor-demand construct applied by Leamer 
(1995), Wood (1995) and Rodrik (1997), in the previous section, we defined the labor-demand curve 
under autarky in such a way that it takes into account the adjustment in the goods-price ratio 
necessary to clear the goods markets.  Thus, each point along the autarky labor-demand curve in 
Figure 3 is associated with a different goods-price ratio. 
  But the real wage along the vertical axis itself depends on the goods price ratio.  If the real 
wage is defined in terms of both goods, each time goods prices change, we will have to re-scale the 
vertical axis.  This obviously makes the demand curve meaningless.  The way we get around this 
problem is by measuring the goods price and the wage both in terms of a common numeraire.  In the 
two-factor, two-good model, this is not a serious problem since, for a price change, the wage either  
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rises or falls in terms of both goods.  But in the specific factors model, we are faced with what is 
called the neoclassical ambiguity:  the wage falls in terms of the good whose price rises but rises it in 
terms of the other good.  With changing prices, whether the real wage rises or falls depends on the 
pattern of expenditure. 
  To get around this problem, let us initially assume that workers spend all their income on the 
numeraire good.  We will return to the general case later.  Suppose the economy consists of two 
sectors, with each sector using a specific factor.  Unskilled labor is common to both sectors.   
Holding the quantities of specific factors fixed, it is entirely possible for a larger quantity of labor to 
leave the ratio of outputs of the two goods unchanged.  That is to say, in terms of Figure 2, at a given 
price, output may expand along ray OA
0 (not shown).  If preferences are homothetic, the price under 
autarky will be entirely unchanged and, hence, there will be no difference between the elasticities of 
demand for labor for closed and small, open economies.  In this special case, even the issue of 
numeraire is moot; no matter what the expenditure patterns, the labor-demand elasticity is the same 
under autarky as when the economy is open and small. 
  Figure 4 offers detailed possibilities, assuming homothetic tastes.  Under free trade and the 
small-country assumption, the labor-demand curve is obtained by summing the value-of-marginal-




0, the autarky price coincides with the free-trade price, p
0.  Consider then a higher level 
of L, L’.  Holding p = p
0, the wage on the demand curve is w’.  Under autarky, the price may 
change, however.  If, at p = p
0, L’ is associated with a higher proportion of good 1 to good 2 than L
0, 
p falls and if the opposite is true, it rises.  In the former case, the wage in terms of the numeraire 
good falls below w’ while in the latter case, it rises above w’.  In the former case, the labor-demand  
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curve is less elastic than the one under free trade as shown by DL
ADL
A while, in the latter case, it is 
more elastic as shown by DL
A'DL
A'.  We do not obtain a unique relationship between openness and 
the elasticity of demand for labor.
7 
  Though Figure 4 assumes that workers spend all their incomes on the numeraire good, the 
message conveyed by it can be validated in a more general model.  Thus, for example, suppose the 
price index is p1
bp2
1-b so that the real wage can be written w/(p1
bp2
1-b).  Letting good 2 be the 
numeraire, this wage boils down to w/p1
b.  The question we now ask is whether, for a small 
exogenous increase in the labor demand, w/p1
b falls more or less in a closed economy than in a 
small, open economy. 
 Let  R(p1, 1, L, K1, K2) be the revenue function where K1 and K2 are factors specific to 
sectors 1 and 2, respectively.  By the envelope property of the revenue function, the wage in terms of 
good 2 is given by 
(3)  w = RL(.) 
where RL(.) is the partial derivative of R(.) with respect to labor.  Differentiating (1) totally, we 
obtain 
(4)    L ˆ    w   +   p ˆ    w   =   w ˆ L 1 1
where a hat (^) over a variable indicates the percentage change in that variable, w1 is the elasticity of 
the wage rate with respect to the price of good 1 and wL the elasticity with respect to labor.  In the 
specific-factors model, w1 is positive and less than unity and wL is negative.  The change in the real 
 
     
7In the specific-factors model, when goods prices change, we are also faced with a numeraire 
problem.  The wage falls in terms of the good whose price rises and rises in terms of the other 
good.  This problem makes even the representation of labor demand with goods prices varying 
along it questionable.   In Figure 3, we have essentially ignored this problem by opting for good 
2 as the sole numeraire good.   
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wage can now be written 
(5)    L ˆ    w   +   p ˆ    b)    -    w   (   =   p ˆ    b   -   w ˆ L 1 1 1
In a small, open economy, the goods price does not change and the elasticity of demand for labor is -
1/wL.  In a closed economy, the elasticity will be larger or smaller as the first term in (5) makes 
positive or negative contribution.  In general, there is no presumption that the contribution of the first 
term will be negative, however. 
2.2  Capital Mobility and the Elasticity of demand for Labor 
  In discussing the implications of capital mobility in the context of the wage debate, we are 
confronted with the issue of whether we can still maintain the assumption of two factors or we must 
switch to a three-factor model.  If the objective is to focus on wage inequality, i.e., the unskilled-to-
skilled-wage ratio, as done by a large body of the recent literature, there is little choice but to switch 
to a three-factor model.  But if the objective is to focus exclusively on unskilled wages, one can still 
push forward with the two-factor model, replacing skilled labor in the previous model by capital.  
Though this route has some limitations to be discussed later, since it is the one followed by Rodrik, I 
consider it first. 
  Assume that there are two factors called labor and capital and denoted L and K, respectively. 
 Consider first the implications of capital mobility alone, assuming that the country does not trade in 
goods.
8  Make the small-country assumption so that capital flows freely in and out of the country at a 
given rental rate.  We must now define the labor-demand curve such that the stock of capital varies 
endogenously along it.  Assume that, at the initial factor endowments, L
0 and K
0, the rental rate 
 
8 The discussion in this section does not pay explicit attention to the external-balance condition.  
But this can be done, following Mundell’s (1957) treatment in his classic work.  
 
 15 
                    
under autarky, r
0, coincides with the world rental rate.  Given r
0, equations (1a) and (1b) can be 
solved for p
0 and w
0.  This yields (L
0, w
0) as a point on the labor demand curve. 
  Consider next a larger quantity of labor, L’, when capital is mobile internationally.  At the 
original goods price, the wage rate corresponding to it on the labor demand curve is w
0 with more of 
good 2 and less of good 1 produced.  The goods market may not clear at these outputs and prices, 
however.  For example, with the relative supply of good 1 declining, under homothetic tastes, there 
is an upward pressure on the relative price of good 1.  This, in turn, puts upward pressure on the 
rental rate, attracting foreign capital.  The additional capital expands sector 1 and contracts sector 2, 
thus, reducing the upward pressure on the price of good 1 as also the rental rate.  The inflow must 
continue until a new equilibrium is reached at which w
0, r
0 and p
0 are restored.  The ratio of 
quantities consumed, after netting out the payment for foreign capital, is also restored to its original 
level.  The new point on the labor-demand curve is (L’, w
0) indicating an infinitely elastic labor 
demand curve between L
0 and L’.
9  The key difference with the free-goods-trade case is that, in the 
present case, we do not get complete specialization so that the labor-demand curve is perfectly 
elastic everywhere. 
  In the absence of capital mobility and goods trade, we have already seen that strictly positive 
income elasticities for both goods will lead to a downward-sloped labor-demand curve along which 
the goods price (rather than the quantity of capital) adjusts endogenously.  But if negative income 
elasticities are admitted, the downward slope is not guaranteed.  Alternatively, even with positive 
income elasticities of demand everywhere, if there are three or more goods, labor demand can be 
locally horizontal or even upward sloped.  Thus, by itself, capital mobility does not necessarily 
 
     
9This is, of course, due to substitutability between trade and factor mobility noted by Mundell  
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imply a more elastic labor-demand curve either. 
  What happens if we compare the case of perfect capital mobility with no mobility at a free-
trade equilibrium?  If it is assumed that the conditions for factor-price equalization under free trade 
between our country and the rest of the world are satisfied for all labor quantities under 
consideration, the presence of capital mobility will do nothing to the demand for labor:  it will be 
perfectly elastic both with and without capital mobility. 
  For capital mobility to make a difference, it must be assumed that free trade by itself is 
insufficient to yield factor-price equalization.  Though there are many possibilities, two of them are 
especially worth considering.  (i) We may assume, as done by Rodrik, that the economy is 
completely specialized in the production of one of the two goods.  (ii) We may assume that 
technologies of production differ so that in spite of a diversified production structure, goods-price 
equalization is insufficient to lead to factor price equalization. 
  (i) Complete Specialization: The Rodrik Case 
  As in Rodrik (1997, Appendix A), assume that the economy is completely specialized in the 
capital intensive good which it exports.  With p
0 given from the world market and K = K
0, equation 
(2) for i = 1 (after replacing S by K) gives us the demand for unskilled labor in the absence of capital 
mobility.  This is an inverse relationship between w and L as shown by curve DL
TDL
T in Figure 5. 
  Under capital mobility, suppose the rental rate in the outside world is r
0.  Given K = K
0 and r 
= r
0, we can solve (1a) and (2) for i = 1 (after substituting r for s and K for S) for w and L.  For ease 
of comparison, assume that the solution, (w
0 L
0), lies on DL
TDL
T in Figure 5 and is represented by 
point Q





associated rental rate is higher than r
0.  This, in turn, attracts foreign capital.  The flow continues 
until the labor-to-capital ratio is restored to L
0/K
0, with the result that the wage rate also achieves its 
original level of w
0.  We have an infinitely elastic labor demand curve. 
  (ii) Diversification: An Alternative Case 
  Assuming free trade, this higher elasticity of the labor-demand curve under capital mobility 
is not inevitable, however.  If we modify the model so as to allow diversification in production, the 
labor-demand curve becomes perfectly elastic even in the absence of capital mobility.  Thus, allow 
for differences in technology between the home country and the outside world.  To be concrete, 
assume that technology in sector 1 in the country is superior, say, in the Hicks-neutral sense, while 
that in sector 2 is the same as in the outside world.  At the given world price, this will establish a 
higher rental on capital and lower wage at home than abroad.  As already explained with the help of 
Figure 1, even in the absence of capital mobility, the demand for labor curve in this situation is 
infinitely elastic for labor quantities within the diversification cone defined by the given factor 
prices.  Only outside this range, complete specialization in one of the products results in the demand 
curve sloping downward. 
  If capital is mobile internationally, since the rental rate is higher in the home country, it 
flows into the latter.  But, with the goods price given from the world market, the rental rate remains 
unchanged as long as the economy is diversified.  Therefore, capital continues to flow into the 
country until it is completely specialized in the production of good 1.  Once complete specialization 
obtains, we can apply the analysis of the previous (Rodrik's) case:  we obtain an infinitely elastic 
demand for labor.  But as shown in the previous paragraph, this shape also obtains over the range 
defined by the relevant diversification cone in the absence of capital mobility.  
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  The thesis that capital mobility necessarily leads to a more elastic labor demand curve is 
therefore invalid in the two-factor model.  However, I have noted earlier that the implications of 
capital mobility for changes in wage inequality, as contrasted with the level of unskilled wage 
simply cannot be addressed in a two-factor model on which Rodrik relies:  a three-factor model with 
skilled and unskilled labor and capital must be used.  Taking the goods prices as given in the world 
market as Rodrik (1997) does and assuming two goods, there is no guarantee in such a model that 
capital mobility will make labor demand more elastic.  With three factors, it is possible for factors to 
exhibit complementarity, which can lead to unexpected results.  An inflow of capital in this model 
can raise or lower the unskilled wage, making the effect of such inflow on the elasticity of labor 
demand ambiguous in general. 
3.  Openness and Wage Outcomes 
  The key conclusion I draw from the analysis in the previous section is that we cannot accept 
as compelling the results based on the assumption that the labor-demand curve is more elastic when 
the economy is open than when it is closed.  To evaluate the implications of openness for wage 
outcomes, we cannot rely on a reduced-form construct whose microeconomic foundations have now 
been shown to be questionable. Instead, we must work directly with the underlying model as was 
done by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) in their original analysis of some of these issues. 
  The broader question addressed by Rodrik was formulated by Deardorff and Hakura (1994) 
as follows: "How do wages respond differently to changes in economic conditions at home when 
international trade is allowed to change too, as compared with being held constant?"  Rodrik 
answers this question with respect to the incidence of a higher labor standard, the impact of 
increased volatility and the impact on the bargaining power of workers, focusing on the extreme  
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cases of free trade and autarky. 
  To recapitulate, Rodrik offers three results relating to wage outcomes: 
(i) The more open an economy, the greater the reduction in the wage received by workers as 
a result of the introduction of a higher labor standard. 
(ii) The more open an economy, the greater the volatility in both earnings and hours worked 
resulting from shocks to labor demand.   
(iii) The greater the openness, the less the bargaining power of workers and, hence, the lower 
the wages of workers. 
Let us consider each of these in turn in the 2x2 and specific-factors model. 
3.1  The 2x2 Model 
 Incidence 
  Let us revert back to our original labeling so that unskilled and skilled labor are the two 
factors with 1 being skilled-labor intensive.  A key claim of Rodrik (1997, pp. 17-19) is that workers 
bear a higher incidence of the cost introduced by a higher safety standard in a sector in an open 
economy relative to that in a closed economy.  Following Harberger's (1962) seminal analysis, this 
conclusion is readily examined using the 2x2 model, without having to worry about the elasticity of 
demand for unskilled labor. 
  Consider first the small-open-economy case.  In Figure 6, we depict the unit-cost pricing 
conditions introduced in equations (1a) and (1b).  The curve labeled c1(s, w) = p
0 shows various 
combinations of s and w that yield a cost of p
0 when resources are efficiently employed in sector 1.  
The slope of the curve at a point represents the optimal skilled-to-unskilled-labor ratio at the factor- 
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price combination shown by that point.  A similar interpretation applies to curve c2(s, w) = 1.  
Because good 1 is skilled-labor intensive and we measure w on the horizontal axis, the unit-cost 
curve associated with this good cuts the unit-cost curve for good 2 from below.  Assuming both 
goods are produced, the average-cost pricing conditions should hold simultaneously for both goods 
which, in turn, yields E
0 as the equilibrium factor-price point. 
  Suppose now that we introduce a higher safety standard in the labor-intensive sector.   
Assuming the cost to be a proportion t of the wage rate, this change shifts the unit-cost curve 
associated with good 2 horizontally to the left by t.w.  The wage paid by the firm must now include 
the cost of the safety standard, leaving a lower net wage payable to workers.  The shifted curve is 
shown by c2(s, (1+t)w) = 1 in Figure 6.  At the new intersection, the unskilled wage declines and 
skilled wage rises.  Intuitively, at constant goods prices, a tax on unskilled labor through a higher 
safety standard in the unskilled-labor-intensive sector causes that sector to shrink.  Since sector 1 
uses less unskilled labor per unit of skilled labor, at the original factor prices, this creates an excess 
supply of labor and forces the wage to fall. 
  The higher safety standard leads to a decline in the relative supply of the unskilled-labor-
intensive good, good 2, and income.  In a small, open economy, these changes are accommodated 
through trade without any change in the relative good price.  In a closed economy, assuming 
preferences to be homothetic for now, these changes generate an upward pressure on the relative 
price of good 2.  This increase in the price leads to a partial reversal of the decline in the unskilled 
wage, yielding Rodrik's result that a higher safety standard leads to a smaller decline in the wage in a 
closed economy. 
  But this is not an inevitable outcome.  If preferences are nonhomothetic such that the decline  
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in real income is accompanied by a sufficiently large decrease in the demand for good 2, in a closed 
economy, the relative price of good 2 could actually fall.  In this case, the wage decline will be larger 
than in an open economy, reversing Rodrik's result. 
  But even this is only half of the story since so far we have focused on the introduction of a 
higher safety standard in the unskilled-labor-intensive sector.  Suppose, instead, the higher standard 
is introduced in the skilled-labor-intensive sector.  In this case, it is the unit-cost curve of good 1 in 
Figure 6 that shifts to the left, leading to a rise in the unskilled wage at constant goods prices.  
Intuitively, the higher standard causes the unskilled-labor-intensive good to expand which, in turn, 
increases the demand for unskilled labor and raises its return. 
  In a small, open economy, the story ends here.  But in a closed economy, assuming 
homothetic tastes, the expansion of the unskilled-labor-intensive good lowers the price of unskilled-
labor-intensive good and reverses partially the wage increase.  As such, the net increase in wage is 
larger in an open than in a closed economy.  In this case, openness works to the advantage of 
workers. 
  Finally, suppose that the safety standard is introduced in both sectors.  Given our assumption 
that the cost of the standard is a constant proportion of the wage rate, at the initial prices, this change 
has no effect on the relative outputs of the two goods.
10  Therefore, if preferences are homothetic, the 
autarky price is unchanged.  The incidence of the standard on the workers is the same in a closed and 
a small, open economy.  If tastes are nonhomothetic such that the reduction in income lowers the 
relative demand for the skilled-labor-intensive good, the introduction of the safety standard raises the 
 
     
10Intuitively, the standard works like a proportional tax at the same rate on labor use in both 
sectors.  Given fixed labor supply, such a tax works like a lump sum tax and has no effect on the 
allocation of labor between the two sectors.  
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relative price of the unskilled-labor-intensive good under autarky and, thus, reverses partially the 
wage decline.  We have the opposite of Rodrik's result.  If nonhomotheticity works in the opposite 
direction, lowering the price of the labor-intensive good under autarky, we get Rodrik's result. 
 Volatility 
  Rodrik (1997, 19-23) also uses the assumption of a higher elasticity of labor demand to 
argue that openness leads to a greater volatility in labor's earnings.  It is easy to show that there is no 
compelling case for this result either.  To give a dramatic example, suppose that the domestic 
demand shifts so as to lower the demand for the unskilled-labor-intensive good.  This change lowers 
the price of the unskilled-labor-intensive good more in a closed than in a large, open economy and 
has no effect at all in a small, open economy.  It follows that the unskilled wage declines more in a 
closed than in a large, open economy and remains entirely unchanged in a small, open economy.  
Contrary to Rodrik's conclusion, we have greater volatility in the unskilled wage in a closed than an 
open economy. 
  Next consider the shock analyzed by Rodrik:  a shift in productivity.  In terms of a 
construction similar to Figure 6, a Hicks-neutral technical progress in, say, sector 1 shifts the unit-
cost curve of that sector radially out, causing the unskilled wage to decline at constant goods prices.  
In a small, open economy, the story will end there.  But if the economy is closed, the change 
increases the supply of good 1 relative to good 2 and, given homothetic tastes, lowers the price of 
good 1.  The reduction in the price, in turn, shifts the unit-cost curve of good 1 back in Figure 6.  It 
can be shown that if the elasticity of substitution in demand happens to be unity, this reverse shift 
exactly offsets the initial shift due to the increase in productivity.  We observe no change in the 




  If the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, however, the decline in the relative price of 
good 1 under autarky is sufficiently large to push the unit-cost curve of good 1 closer to the origin 
than before the technical change.  In this case, the unskilled wage actually falls in terms of the 
numeraire and there is no guarantee in general that this fall is proportionately less than the rise in the 
wage in the small, open economy case. 
  These examples should make clear that Rodrik's conclusion that openness leads to a greater 
volatility in the earnings of workers is invalid in general.  This should not be surprising, of course, 
since volatility depends on the source of instability, not just on the initial conditions or the structure 
of the economy. 
 Bargaining 
  Finally, Rodrik (1997, 23-25) argues that capital mobility has hurt the interests of unskilled 
workers by reducing their bargaining power.  A full justice to assessing this argument will require a 
full-scale model in which the bargaining process is explicitly formulated.  Since such an exercise is 
beyond the scope of this paper, I take recourse to a simple example from the existing international 
trade literature [Jones (1971), Magee (1971)].  Via this example, I demonstrate that even if we 
accept that openness leads to a decline in the bargaining power, it does not follow that the decline 
will necessarily lower unskilled wages. 
  Thus, consider Figure 7, which is similar to Figure 6.  Suppose the economy is open to trade 
and small so that the goods prices are fixed.  Suppose further that there is a union in the labor-
intensive sector, which keeps the unskilled wage in that sector above that in sector 1.  The skilled 
wage is the same across sectors.  Skilled wage s
0 and unskilled wages w1
0 and w2
0 in sectors 1 and 2  
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illustrate these outcomes. 
   Suppose now that openness is accompanied by a decline in the workers' bargaining power in 
the labor-intensive sector.  Such a decline will actually allow the labor-intensive industry to expand 
and hence unskilled wage to rise in general.  Indeed, as is readily seen from Figure 7, as we reduce 
the gap between the wages in the two sectors, wages received by unskilled workers in both sectors 
rise. 
3.2  The Specific-Factors Model 
 Incidence 
  To take the simplest case, suppose the autarky price coincides with the free-trade price.  
Then the initial equilibrium under autarky as well as free trade can be represented by the intersection 
of the value-of-marginal-product-of-labor (VMPL) curves in Figure 8.  In this figure, O1O2 
represents the total quantity of labor in the economy, L1 is measured to the right from O1 and L2 to 
the left from O2.  The curve labeled V1V1 represents the VMPL in sector 1 and that labeled V2V2 the 
VMPL in sector 2. 
  A rise in the labor standard in sector 1 is represented by a downward shift in the V1V1 curve. 
 The shift, in turn, lowers the wage received by workers in both sectors.  In a small, open economy, 
this is the end of the story.  But under autarky, there is further change due to the fact that the goods 
markets must be cleared endogenously.  At E￿, the output of good 1 has declined while that of good 
2 has risen.  Assuming homothetic preferences, these output changes lead to a rise in the price of 
good 1. 
  Does this rise in the price of good 1 raise the real wage or lower it?  It is well known that the  
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specific factors model is characterized by the so-called neoclassical ambiguity: the wage falls in 
terms of the good experiencing the price increase and rises in terms of the other good.  Unless we 
know more about the consumer's expenditure pattern, we cannot determine whether the real wage 
rises or falls due to the price increase.  In particular, if the consumer spends a large proportion of his 
income on good 1 whose price rises, contrary to Rodrik's claim, the real wage falls more due to the 
rise in the labor standard under autarky than under free trade. 
  In fact, the prospects for Rodrik's position can be bleaker.  So far, we have assumed that the 
initial price under autarky is the same as under free trade.  This assumption is obviously unrealistic.  
Letting good 1 be the country's import good, under autarky, the price of good 1 will be higher than 
the free-trade price.  This fact implies that the VMPL curve in sector 1 under autarky lies above the 
V1V1 curve in Figure 8.  It is then entirely possible for even the initial decline in the wage due to the 
introduction of the higher labor standard, holding prices constant, to be smaller under free trade than 
under autarky. 
  A final point concerns the effect of an increase in the labor standard in both sectors.  In this 
case, both V1V1 and V2V2 curves shift down equally In figure 7.  If the initial prices are assumed to 
be the same under autarky and free trade and preferences are homothetic, the effect on the wage is 
the same under the two scenarios.  If the initial prices differ, the percentage changes in the real wage 
are still the same if the labor standard is modeled as an ad valorem tax.  Consequently, if the real 
wage is higher under autarky, the absolute decline in the wage is also higher under autarky than free 
trade! 
 Volatility 
  In view of the analysis in Figure 8, it should not be surprising that, as in the 2x2 model, the  
 
 26 
implications of trade openness for volatility are also going to be ambiguous in the specific-factors 
model.  As in the 2x2 case, suppose the shock is due to a shift in the domestic demand away from 
the import-competing good, say, good 1.  Under free trade, making the small-country assumption, 
this change has no effect on the goods price ratio and hence the wage rate.  In a closed economy, it 
raises the relative price of good 1 and does impact the real wage.  We clearly have more volatility in 
earnings in the closed-economy setting. 
  Turning next to the shock considered by Rodrik, suppose the productivity in good 1 rises so 
as to increase the marginal product of labor at a give ratio of the specific factor and labor by 1%.  In 
the small, open-economy context, the prices will be unchanged and the wage will rise by less than 
1% in terms of both goods.  Under autarky, the relative price of good 1 will fall and the wage could 
rise by more than 1% if measured in terms of that good.  Again, there is no guarantee that earnings 
are more volatile under free trade. 
 Bargaining 
  The argument made by Rodrik is that a move from autarky to free trade lowers the real wage 
more in the presence of unionization than in its absence since trade leads to a reduction in the 
bargaining power of the union.  To assess the argument, consider Figure 9.  Suppose that in the 
presence of a labor union in sector 1, under autarky, the VMPL curves of sectors 1 and 2 are given 
by V1
UV1
U and V2V2, respectively.  The labor union under autarky holds the wage rate in sector 1 at 
w1
U = bw2
U, where b > 1.  By assumption, opening to trade not only lowers the relative price of good 
1 but also eliminates the labor union thereby yielding a single equilibrium wage w0
T.  The wage 
changes from w1
U in sector 1 and w2
U in sector 2 to w0
T in both sectors. 
  The question we ask is how these changes compare to the changes in the absence of the  
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union.  With no union, under autarky, the output of good 1 will be larger and, with homothetic 
demand, the price of good 1 lower.  That is to say, the VMPL curve in sector 1 will lie below that 
shown by V1
UV1




  Measuring the wage in terms of the numeraire, a movement from autarky to free trade leads 
to a larger decline in the wage in sector 1 and a smaller decline in it in sector 2 in the presence of the 
union than in its absence.  In sector 1, the wage decline from w1
U rather than w0
A in the presence of 
the union; in sector 2, it declines from w2
U rather than w0
A.  If the proportion of the labor force 
belonging to the unionized sector is small as is true in the United States, on average, there is no 
guarantee that the overall wage decline is larger in the presence of a union than in its absence. 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
  In this paper, I have shown that the Leamer-Rodrik-Wood assertion that the demand-for-
labor curve is more elastic in an open than a closed economy is not valid in general.  The statement 
is violated in both the 2x2 and specific-factors models.  Furthermore, many of the results obtained by 
Rodrik (1997) assuming the statement to be true fail to hold (as logically true, as distinct from being 
possible outcomes) when we spell out the full structure of the model. 
  Thus, within two most popular models of trade--the 2x2 and specific-factors models--, there 
is no guarantee that openness leads to a greater incidence of higher labor standards being borne by 
workers or to greater volatility in wage earnings as a consequence of shocks to the economy.  It is 
also not true in general that when openness leads to reduced bargaining power, it contributes 
negatively to wages.  In the 2x2 model, exactly the opposite may happen. 
  Rodrik's analysis focuses on the implications of openness, especially factor mobility, for the  
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response of wages to changes in policy or other exogenous variables.  A larger question concerns the 
contribution of the mobility of capital and immobility of labor to the level of unskilled wages.  Here 
it stands to reason that if anything, free mobility of capital and immobility of unskilled labor must 
have helped the wages of the unskilled in the United States.  During 1980s, the United States has 
been a large recipient of foreign capital.  The presumption is that this must have contributed 
favorably to both skilled and unskilled wages.  Similarly, if unskilled labor had been mobile, the 
United States would have been an importer (over and above the illegal immigration that did take 
place) of them.  This, too, would have hurt unskilled workers.  The key determinant of the level of 
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Figure 1:  Labor Demand in a Small, Open Economy in the 2x2 Model

















































Figure 3:  The Autarky Demand Curve is More Elastic at Wage
                  Rates Other Than the One Along the Horizontal 































































Figure 5:  Labor Demand in a 2x2,  Small, Open Economy under Complete Specialization
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Figure 7:  The Effect of a Reduction in the Wage Premium




































































Figure 9:  Bargaining and the Specific-Factors Model
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